TWO YEARS IN 30 WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS

In the 1990s, words and phrases such as “zero mort", “sans objet”, “power to the people” and “Paul Biya must go”. In the 2000s, words and expressions such as “grandes ambitions”, “appels du peuple” and “émergence” emerged. Going further back in time, “Green revolution" would be quite recognisable to fifty somethings, while “rigour and moralisation” would be well known to fifty somethings. These words and expressions meant particular things to the general public much beyond their basic lexical referents.

The process by which social phenomena and associated words integrate a language is a socio linguistic phenomenon that is true to every language and is a major part of sociolinguistics.

In 2006, ‘google’ entered the Oxford English dictionary as a verb meaning: search for information about (someone or something) on the Internet using the search engine Google. The creation of the Google search engine and it's great impact in facilitating the search for information is well known to most and the insertion of the word into the dictionary was just a logical formulation off a usage that was already popular.
 

In the past few years, other words have had such popular usage and recognition that they have been entered into various dictionaries. Examples are:

Bridezilla (n): A combination of “bride” + “Godzilla” (a monster from a horror movie) – this word is used to describe a woman who behaves very badly during the process of planning her wedding; she is extremely demanding and difficult to work with.

Frenemy (n): A person who pretends to be a friend, but is really an enemy

Sexting (n): The sending of sexually explicit photographs or messages via mobile phone.

Unfriend (v): Remove (someone) from a list of friends or contacts on a social networking site.
 

These words would not be familiar to someone who lived and used the English language before the ‘Age of the Internet’. The same applies in reverse and resulting in words that become obsolete or archaic. For example, an average teenager would not know what is a Floppy disk, walkman, a Polaroid or an audio cassette.
 

The same process occurs within the same language as it evolves in different parts of the world… resulting in different Englishes for the case of English. For example, we're there a dictionary of Cameroon English, it would be perfectly acceptable to find therein words like ‘graffi’ for people of the Grassfields; or ‘rappa’ for local fabric generally worn by women - not to be confused with the English homophone ‘wrapper’ whose meaning its more general than the reference to ‘fabric’.
 

In the past two years in Cameroon, political activity and social strife have been sufficiently vigorous that a wide vocabulary has emerged to reflect the realities of these times and to refer things, concepts or events that are recognisable to large parts of the Cameroonian Anglophone community. NOTE THAT ‘Anglophone’ here does not have the limited meaning (some would say ‘general meaning’) of speaker of English.
 

Our objective in this article is to attempt a repertoire of words and expressions that have either emerged in the period referred to, that have developed new or specific meaning or that were already in English dictionaries but whose usage have become more commonplace.
 

In order to arrive at the list of entries, we collected proposals from 100 English speaking Cameroonians who either originate from or reside in the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon. Each provided a list of 10 words and their definitions on the specific theme of the sociopolitical / security crisis witnessed and sustained in Cameroon. A list was drawn based on recurrence of words proposed and similarity of meaning and usage. A few other words were shortlisted from the written productions or public declarations of the political elite or pundits who have commented the crisis extensively and profusely.
 

The final list of words retained are presented here in alphabetical order.

Agent (La Republique Agent)

(n) /ˈeɪdʒ(ə)nt/

An Agent, usually used in its full form: “La République Agent” is a spy. La République Agents are reportedly either civilians or security officers in civilian attire. In the case of social media, generally they are avatars or persons who do not use or reveal their true identities and who, by doing so, do not inspire the confidence of their interlocutors.
 

In the wake of the crisis in the North west and South west regions, arrests were massive and indiscriminate. Dozens of people were reported to have been arrested just as a result of engaging in a conversation with unknown persons in a taxi or public place and in which conversation they had shown sympathy for the protesters. Some corrupt security personnel racketted persons that they accused sharing of seditious opinions and some individuals profited from the atmosphere of fear to settle personal issues by accusing others of sedition.
 

As a result, communities of trust emerged. These communities, structured or not, were made of persons who trusted each other enough to to share their feelings and opinions on political issues. People who were not members of a community were a priori “agents’ until they proved that they could be trusted.

Ambazonia

(proper noun) /ambə’zəʊnɪə/

Ambazonia is an appellation that has come to mean many things to different persons.

Territory of reference

The territory referred to as Ambazonia is the territory that was administered by the British as a United Nations mandated territory of Southern Cameroons.

The same territory was referred to as West Cameroon following the Plebiscite of 11th February 1961 when Southern Cameroonians chose to achieve independence by joining La Republique du Cameroun.

Within the administrative configuration of the modern state of Cameroon, the same territory is referred to as the North West region and the South West Region.

History

Ambazonia derives from Ambas Bay also referred to, in some sources, as Amboises Bay or Bay of Amboise. It is located in the Gulf of Guinea at the foot of Mount Cameroon. The origin of the term ‘Ambas’ or ‘Amboise’ is uncertain.
 

However, in 1858, Rev Alfred Saker, a British Missionary arrived in Ambas Bay with a group of followers from Fernando Po. Saker had worked in Fernando Po since 1843 until relations with the Spanish administration became untenable. At the instigation of Jesuits, the Spanish administration expelled Saker. He sailed northwards to Ambas Bay where he had worked previously with some Duala Chiefs. He bought a large piece of land (16km - 8km) on the coast from William I, ruler of Bimbia, and started a community (Victoria) of which he was administrator until 1876.

Alfred Saker Monument

His work and influence among local communities easily stretched northwards to cover what became the British Protectorate of Ambas Bay governed from the British territory of Nigeria and almost exactly similar to the territory described as Southern Cameroons, West Cameroon and North West / South West above. Subsequent administrators were George Grenfell (1877-1878) and Q.W. Thomson (1878-1879).

The Germans took over the territory in 1884 until their defeat in the First World War in 1918 when it was receded to the British as a Trust territory and referred to as Southern Cameroons.
 

The wave of decolonisation blew across Africa in the 1950s and in the case of Cameroon, culminated in United Nations Resolution 1608 which recognised the results of a plebiscite held in Southern Cameroons whereby the people of Southern Cameroons had freely decided to achieve independence by joining La Republique du Cameroun which had achieved independence from France on 1st January 1960.
 

Considering that both sides (La Republique du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons) agreed

1. To adopt a Federal system of government wherein both sides (referred to as East Cameroon and West Cameroon) were federated states with equal status (see article 1, Paragraph 1 of 1961 constitution)
2. That the Federal arrangement was conditionally inviolable (see article 47 of 1961 constitution)

Considering that the Federation was abolished in 1972 following a circumvention of article 47 referred to above and resulting in what became the United Republic of Cameroon;

Considering that in 1984, a decision was made to rename the country the Republic of Cameroon or La Republique du Cameroun (original name of East Cameroon before the 1961 agreement);

Fon Gorgi Dinka, a lawyer of Southern Cameroonian descent,  forwarded the argument that East Cameroon had seceded from the federation and that by doing so, had left West Cameroon independent. Thus, drawing from the historical designation of Ambas Bay, he coined the term Ambazonia to refer to what he said was the newly independent state.
 

Of course, and unfortunately for Fon Gorji Dinka, the government had seen the return to the name ‘La Republique du Cameroun’ not as secession but as a move to reinforce the unitarism for which the reunification of 1961 and the unification of 1972 had been prequels. Also, an attempted coup d’etat in in 1984 meant that the country was on high security alert and all ideas that were contrary to state policy and to the authority of the government all across the country were seen not as political opinion but as dangerous sedition.

Thus, Gorji Dinka paid the price with his freedom and his interpretation of the change of name lost traction.

Thirty-two years later in 2016, what was seen as inadequate responses by the government to corporate grievances by teachers and lawyers on the systematic disregard and dilution of the Anglophone sub-systems of education and judicial practice quickly degenerated into a political crisis borne of the violation in 1972 of Article 47 of the Federal Constitution of 1961. Separatists who had always existed marginally or as an insignificant minority amplified the causal relationship between the violation of 1972 and the gradual disappearance of the Anglophone identity. They pushed for independence and resuscitated the Gorji Dinka’s coinage, Ambazonia, as a name for their independent state.
 

The traction that this gathered raised the profile of the term Ambazonia, and brought it to the public conscience as a term henceforth recognised and used by Cameroonians and referring to a political fact of their times.
 

Affectivity

Though Ambazonia has effectively become a lexical reality of Cameroonian diction and political opinion, it must be said that that effectiveness is, at best, affective. It is a luscious aspiration to self-determination which some analysts see as political blackmail aimed at obtaining effective local government and protecting a cultural identity and heritage which can be traced through history but which good governance will put to bed.

Derivatives

AMBA: Refers to the currency of the imagined country

AMBA FIGHTERS: Refers to all persons that have taken up arms to combat what they refer to as ‘the illegal occupation’ of their land

AMBALAND: Another term for Ambazonia

AMBA TIME: Refers to the time in Ambazonia.

AMBAZONIAN (1): Pertaining to Ambazonia

AMBAZONIAN (2): Citizen of Ambazonia. There are two noteworthy curiosities about the pattern of use of this word.

Firstly, it is generally used in the third person plural. The reason is that to define oneself as Ambazonian or to tag a clearly identifiable person as Ambazonian means that the person(s) referred to are secessionist or sympathise with secession. They can therefore be sued for secession.

Secondly, for the above reason, it is generally used in the second person as a teaser or a provocation by persons who are not sympathetic to the Ambazonian aspiration towards persons that they want to put on the defensive.

Thirdly, most persons who define themselves as Ambazonians either live out of Cameroon or they live in Cameroon but are not using their true identity when they tag themselves as Ambazonian.
 

In summary,
- For those who relate to historical orthodoxy, Ambazonia is a territory… a fact of history;
- For those who seek separation, Ambazonia is an aspiration;
- For those who subscribe to the idea that bad governance is the fundamental cause of the crisis, Ambazonia a protest;
- For those who seek the preservation of the Anglo-saxon heritage albeit within a single Cameroon (unitary or federal), Ambazonia is a state of mind; and
- For those who benefit from the status quo, Ambazonia is a nightmare.

Ambazozo

Ambazozo is also a derivative of Ambazonia. It is a derogatory term for Ambazonians.

It is uncertain who first used/coined the term but many attribute it to Claude Abate, a Facebook profile name which later became Dany Claude.

Before 2016, Dany Claude’s badly veiled sarcasm pointed in the general direction of the West, North West and South West Regions. He is known to have used the imagery of ‘taro’ or ‘achu' and ‘water fufu’ to describe the target of his derision.
 

Taro/Achu is a traditional meal eaten in the North West and West Regions. It is served by boring a ‘cavity’ in the middle of a portion of pounded cocoyams and a sauce poured in the cavity. In the light of Dany Claude’s imagery, people from the North West and West Regions had no brains and their heads were an empty cavity.

‘Water fufu’ is a traditional meal in the South West Region. Dany Claude used the image of Water fufu to suggest that people from the South West Region only had water in their heads.
 

Such derision was so typical of his style that his use (and perhaps coinage) of Ambazozo came naturally.

Morphologically, Ambazozo is possibly a combination of Ambazonia and ‘zozo'. ZOZO is a French slang abbreviation for spermatozoa. It also refers to a stupid and worthless person. By combining Ambazonia and ‘zozo’, Dany Claude succeeded to reproduce his outlook on the people of the West and Anglophone Regions and did so in a new political context.

Anglophone

The term Anglophone, beyond its primary definition as persons who express themselves in the English language has, in the last two years, attracted greater attention and taken greater significance in Cameroonians’ definition of their cultural identities.

In an article titled “The Anglophone Problem” (Dec 2016 - http://harryacha.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-anglophone-problem-past-few-weeks.html), we attempted to answer the question “Who is an Anglophone” and forwarded that the idea of an “Anglophone spectrum” laid out in for levels:

Level 1: Considering that Cameroon has two official languages (English and French) and that these two languages are factors of linguistic hegemony in a country with over 200 languages, an Anglophone is a Cameroonian whose first official language is English.
 

Level 2: These are people who descend from lineages that are founded in the former West Cameroon. Their first official language may not be English.

Level 3: These are Francophones whose language of instruction is English, who have learnt English later in life enough to be affected by the English tradition and Francophones whose language of instruction is French, but who have lived long enough in the English-speaking zones that they have either: integrated the Anglophone way of life, are victims of some of the deviances highlighted above or, if they are not victims, at least they understand that Anglophones suffer institutional injustices on account of their heritage.

Level 4: The highest level in the spectrum includes Cameroonians who may or may not speak English and may not be descendants of West Cameroon, but who understand the Anglophone Problem as presented above, admit to its existence, and actively defend the right to protect the Anglophone heritage, culture, and values within the spirit of the Foumban accords.

The reason why the highest level of Anglophonism includes people who may not speak English is that Anglophonism in Cameroon is not a just a linguistic identity, but a socio-political outlook on the history, management, and political becoming of Cameroon.

There are many different ways in which this spectrum can be re-written. In fact, some have referred to it as comprising of Linguistic Anglophones, Historical Anglophones and Political Anglophones.
 

However, the following patterns have emerged in the past two years in relation to anglophonism:

REJECTION: In line with the integrationist ideology, some have rejected anglophonism in Cameroon. They argue that in Cameroon, there are no Anglophones and no francophones… just Cameroonians. The objective seems, clearly, to downplay the uniqueness of Anglophones as a people with a heritage beyond clanism. Such rejection had some traction until the Head of State clearly mentioned the “Anglophone” and “Francophone” composites in his address to Cameroonians on 31st december 2017.

CLAIM OF BELONGING: Some others do not reject the fact that there are Anglophones in Cameroon but try to project Linguistic Anglophonism at the expense of Political Anglophonism. They argue that they are Anglophones because they express themselves well in English, because English was their language of instruction at school and is their first official language AND YET they originate from Francophone regions and do not feel the marginalisation claimed by ‘other anglophones’.

AFFIRMATION: More than before, a greater number of Anglophone Cameroonians have become inclined to affirm their anglophone identity as if in protest. It is common these days to hear anglophones say: “I am anglophone” with such a tone as if to say that what they actually mean is “What are you going to do about it?” or “Live with it!”. They are more inclined to express themselves in English even when they can speak French and especially when their interlocutor may not understand them but may feel embarrassed to ask them to speak in French.

PURISM: The more unlikely it seems that any constructive dialogue will take place between opposing sides of the crisis, the more violence is perpetrated by both sides, the seems to grow a tendency of purification of Anglophonism. This is acted not only through stricter vetting of individuals’ circles of trust, but also an increased affirmation of persons who are Anglophone by descent and not just by linguistic competence.

BringBackOurInternet

BringBackOurInternet was a protest hashtag against the suspension of the Internet from the North West and South West Regions.

In mid-January 2017, the crisis reacheached what was considered fever pitch at the time and what was definitely a turning point. Negotiations that had been going on for months between the government and the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) were halted, the CACSC was banned, its leaders arrested, hundreds of activists arrested, hundreds more fled to neighbouring countries and the internet was shut down.

Radicalisation witnessed a surge at home though activists were less inclined to speak out. Leaders who had succeeded to flee abroad coordinated their actions with Anglophones in the diaspora with the aim of raising the profile of the crisis on the international scene. As a result, many protest marches took place in foreign capitals. The BringBackOurInternet hashtag was one of the instruments used in this effort.

In the regions affected by the blackout, businesses crumbled, activities in financial institutions plummeted, businesses relocated and internet users downloaded Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to circumvent the measure.

The hashtag was modelled on the very successful campaign (#BringBackOurGirls) for the released of 300 girls (Chibok Girls) abducted by Boko Haram two years earlier in Northern Nigeria. The interruption of internet services was positioned by campaigners as an abuse on human rights (restricted access to information) and as collective punishment against an entire population for the perceived crimes of a few individuals. Hashtag tracking engines (eg. www.hashtracking.com) record that #BringBackOurInternet was used over a million times and most famously by former CIA operative (turned whistleblower), Edward Snowden.

Internet was restored after 93 days, but the hashtag had decreed its place in the lexical record of the period. A new hashtag (#TakeBackYourInternet) was created to promote the fact that the return of the internet was not a solution to the fundamental grievances, but did not gain as much traction.

Coffin Revolution

The Coffin Revolution is used to refer to ‘2016-ongoing’ phase of the Anglophone Problem. The Anglophone Problem itself is a problem that is as old as the current territorial form of Cameroon. It has known various peaks and troughs notably in 1961, 1972, 1984, 1990 and 1993.

In late 2016, grievances made to the government by Anglophone teachers and lawyers. Though both corps decided to combine the efforts and heap the pressure, the standoff was largely sectoral until a ‘little known’ local journalist, Mancho Bibixy (aka Mancho BBC) took the grievances to the streets.

Touring the Streets of Bamenda in a coffin on 21st November 2016, Mancho mobilised the population and protested the poor living conditions in the city in general and the bad conditions of roads in particular. He told the population that he had come out with his coffin because he was ready to die for the cause. Though unrelated disturbances had been recorded in Buea and Kumba in the South West Region, Mancho’s display was emblematic not only because of the number of people mobilised but also and especially because he made a connection between the condition of roads and and the problem of local government. This connection had the subtle suggestion that living conditions would have been much better under a federal-type government as the 1961 Constitution had provided.

His subsequent arrest in early 2017 turned him into a cult hero and his ‘coffin action’ gave its name to the 2016 peak in an old problem.

Colonial

‘Colonial’ is used to refer to symbols of government authority. Expressions such as ‘Colonial governor’, ‘Colonial DO (Divisional Officer)’, ‘Colonial military’ have been widely used.

Since the symbolic declaration of independence on 1st October 2017, separatists declared that their country was under occupation by a ‘foreign’ country and thenceforth, used ‘Colonial’ to prefix government officials. ‘Colonial governors’ are said to be the governors of the North West and south West regions, while ‘Colonial DOs’ are prefects and sub-prefects of the divisions and subdivisions of the two anglophone regions.

The term may not have been used much prior to October 2017, but considering Fon Gorji Dinka’s theory (see ‘Ambazonia’ above), the idea dates as far back as 1984. For those who see the referendum of 20th May 1972 as a violation of the 1961 Constitution, the idea may even go further back to 1972.

Consortium

“The Consortium” is the term used to refer to the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC).

Once the teachers’ and lawyers’ syndicates had established that the sectoral grievances they had made were actually symptoms of a more profound malaise and once other trade unions had joined the party (traders, transporters etc) had joined the party, it was agreed to create a single platform  to negotiate the institutional recognition of the anglophone heritage in the spirit of the 1961 constitution. The CACSC was thus created in December 2016.

Amongst others, the steering committee comprised of Barrister Felix Nkongho Agbor Balla (President), Dr. Fontem Neba (Secretary General), Tassang Wilfred (Programs coordinator), Barrister Harmony Bobga (Adviser), Mr George Ngwane (Adviser).

It was accepted by the Anglophone community as their legitimate representatives in negotiations with government emissaries. The Anglophone community mobilise behind the Consortium in the same way that they had stood behind their delegates at the Foumban Conference and with similar confidence as they had in the delegates at the All Anglophone Conference in 1993.

Schools and courts shut down, sit-in strikes were respected, markets were closed and transport was paralysed as the Consortium instructed. Government appeals for normalcy were not heeded and it became obvious that government was losing its authority in the anglophone regions.

On 17th January 2017, the Consortium was banned. Barrister Agbor Balla and Dr Neba Fontem were arrested. Tassang Wilfred and Harmony Bobga went into hiding and later fled the country. However, the Consortium had stamped its mark on the popular conscience.

Contri Sunday

Contri Sunday is the code word for a sit-in strike or Ghost towns.

More generally, the term ‘Contri Sunday’ (not the concept) is an adaptation to the modern/western calendar.

‘Contri’ derives from the English ‘Country’ and is used in the expression ‘Contri Sunday’ to mean ‘Traditional’. Other expressions using the term include

Contri chop = Traditional food

Contri dance = Traditional dance

Contri talk = local language

Contri Sunday is the day for the gods in the local traditions. It is the Holy day as Friday is for Muslims, Saturday for Jews and sunday for Christians. It is a rest day, and in most traditions, it is not allowed to farm or do other physically demanding tasks.

In most traditions in the anglophone regions and grassfield area, it is the first of an eight-day week. They are not regulated by the laws of the country and differ from one culture/village to another.

When the protests began, sit-in strikes and school boycott were the main means of demonstrations. Aware of the strong restrictive laws on and systematic banning of public demonstrations as well as the potential for violent police crack-down, protesters opted for sit-in strikes to avoid confrontation and eventual loss of lives. On appointed days, whole towns, cities and villages became ‘Ghost towns’. Market stalls and shops were closed, schools were shut and public transport was not operational.

Although this affected the local economies quite significantly and directly, the effect on the national economy was also noteworthy. However, the objective was to show to government authorities that the people were ready to make sacrifices to obtain what they wanted and that their allegiances were elsewhere.

Of course, sympathy with or calls for Ghost towns became a reason for which people could be arrested. Consequently, the term ‘Contri Sunday’ was used to refer to Ghost towns. Thus, technically, one could not be arrested for sharing information about ‘traditional customs.

Dialogue

In the past two years, DIALOGUE is the one word that most Cameroonians have used. The head of state, members of government, political party leaders, religious leaders, separatists, federalists, international organisations and foreign partners… all have called for dialogue. Everyone seems to agree that DIALOGUE is necessary to find a solution to the crisis. Only, at various times, dialogue has meant various things for various people.

In the early days of the crisis, when Anglophone protesters asked for dialogue they sought to discuss the possibility of a federal system of government wherein an Anglophone federated state would manage the issues that had been tabled by teachers and lawyers. At that time, for government, dialogue meant listening to the grievances and independently deciding what adequate solutions were. This explains

• The constant breakdown in talks between the government and the Consortium
• The government’s unilateral decision that the form of the State was not negotiable
• The fact that government offered two billion francs to assist private schools, insisted on discussing issues raised by teachers separately from issues raised by lawyers, created the Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism all of which were not amongst the demands of the protesters.

As the stand-off persisted, violence increased, the separatist agenda gained support, a great number of Anglophones were arrested, a full school year had been lost for many in the anglophone regions and thousands had been internally displaced. At that time, by September 2017, for anglophones, dialogue meant ‘independent mediation’ while for government, dialogue meant educating the populations in the anglophone regions on its agenda. This explains why

• Anglophone groups had turned their attention to raising the profile of the case to the international community
• The Anglophone leadership was abroad
• Government tagged protesters as terrorists and declared that it will not discuss with terrorists
• Government sent rounds of delegations to the Anglophone regions as well as to foreign capitals to communicate on how it was addressing the issues

More recently, violence has escalated on both sides. Whole villages have been burnt, civilians killed or maimed, hundreds arrested (many held incommunicado), security personnel killed, government officials kidnapped. Dialogue seems to have become a window dressing as both sides appeal for dialogue without showing any signs that they actually wish for it. This explains

• The number of refugees and internally displaced people nearing the 200,000 mark
• Increased clarity in condemnation of violence on both sides by foreign countries and International organisations.

The interest of retaining DIALOGUE in this pseudo-lexicon is not that the word is new to anybody. It is that Cameroonians have taken greater cognisance of the importance of talking to each other and of the importance of institutional mechanisms (including the form of the state) that guarantee the permanence of dialogue independently of the prevailing political ideology or of right of might.

Ekema

Ekema /ekema/ n

Meaning ‘fake’ or ‘fraudulent’ especially referring to official documents.

Example: These two documents contradict each other. The first seems authentic, the second is Ekema.

The term ‘Ekema’ comes from the name of the Mayor of Buea. As Buea became one of the hotbeds of the crisis, its pro government Mayor became somewhat controversial. Some very incendiary comments were attributed to him and some reports hold that a bullet from his gun had been fatally stopped by a protester. The controversies around the Mayor reignited suspicions over his academic attributes and the allegation soon emerged that neither had he ever passed the Advanced General Certificate of Education (GCE A’Levels) nor had he achieved the requirements for the obtention of the first degree and Masters degree that he flaunted. It was reported that he had obtained certifications, by fraudulent means, from the University of Buea and by dint of that, was an academic impostor.

As the crisis developed and communication intensified, fake or exaggerated news was also increasingly used either by persons who just wanted social media buzz or by protesters who sought to amplify their achievements or scare the public.

The term ‘Ekema’ thus emerged and is used by many to refer to a real social phenomenon.

Ethno Fascisme

Ethno Fascisme (fr) n, was initially used mostly by the Francophone intelligentsia, then by the herd.

It refers to the projection of one's ethnic origin or the positioning of it as being superior to another or others.

In the early days of the crisis, once it became apparent that the grievances raised by Anglophones had political undertones Francophone ideologues, in an attempt to remove the legal and historical arguments that underpin the Anglophone case, suggested that Anglophones had embarked on such ethnic blackmail that any ethnic group in the country was in their right to make. They held that the grievances were fundamentally about a supposed right to take over power after 61 years of Francophone rule, 36 of which was held by the Beti/Bulu ethnic groups. To them, the extraction of an Anglophone identity from a more general Cameroonian identity was an attempt to undermine the dictates of demography.

The champion of this cause was Professor Mathias Eric Owona Nguini. The idea of ethno fascism  that he projected (originally coined by Prof. Hubert Mono Ndjana in a different context) was a sequel to that of the appropriation of territorial identification at the expense of national identities which he referred to as ‘repli identitaire’. He argued that Anglophone protesters had a hidden agenda of secession for which the call for federalism was a first step. Both concepts (repli identitaire and ethno-fascisme) quickly provided a perspective from which many non-Anglophones who, for lack of adequate knowledge (see ROOT CAUSES below) on the ‘Anglophone exception’ found an angle from which to explain the crisis. Consequently, the more intense the crisis became, the more animosity grew between Anglophones and francophones as communities, the more the arguments shifted from the fundamental historical facts to the defence of ethnographic belonging.

The ethno fascist argument had two primary weaknesses though… First, Mathias Eric Owona Nguini mixed up (perhaps deliberately) the problems of the representation of sociological groups in the government mechanism and the desire for increased local government. Second, the argument compares the Anglophone community to other ethnic groups in Cameroon and removes from it the political identity associated to its history.

Fake News

Fake News is misinformation or deliberate publication and spread of false or inaccurate information.

The expression is a byproduct of the explosion of social media, the emergence of citizen journalism and sometimes, the search for buzz. It was popularised in the U.S. political scene most famously by President Trump who, it is said, often attempted to discredit unfavorable media reports by describing them as fake news.

Within the context of the crisis witnessed in the passed two years in Cameroon, it became apparent quite early on that information would be key in for either side to gain public support. Also, it became obvious quite early that the public media was biased in its reporting of the crisis and that private media either did not have all the facts of the crisis or chose the government narrative (French language media) or amplified the protesters’ narrative (English language media). Consequently, there was a gap in true information that individuals tried to fill in, sometimes with inaccurate information.

Another important cause for the development and spread of fake news was the need by both sides to discredit each other and muddy the waters. So, for example, when it became obvious that a large part of the anglophone population obeyed the directives of the Consortium, fake Consortium Communiques were spread (probably by pro-government activists) giving instructions that contradicted previous ones our that confused the public. Protesters also produced fake news that was attributed to government services. The case of a fake communique attributed to the Governor of the North West Region asking the population to stay home on 20th May 2018 for security reasons is one such example.

Of all the fake news, the most famous is probably that which abounded a gas explosion at Lake Awing, causing many to drink palm oil copiously.

Federalists

The crisis has sparked intense debates over the form of the state that would best accommodate the country's political history as well as the histories and cultures of the various peoples that make up the country.

The federalist option has three sub-groups.

10-State federalists: Those who think that decentralisation doesn't go far enough to promote local government, but think that federal states should be drawn on the lines of the current administrative configuration of ten regions.

4-State federalists: Those who think that there are fundamental cultural resemblances amongst peoples in larger geographical spheres that pre-date the arrival of European colonial powers and that federalism on such lines would better reflect the cultural realities of Cameroon.

4-State federalists propose North West and West Regions together, South West and Littoral together, the three northern regions together and the Centre, South and East Regions together.

They argue that such a federal configuration will eventually cause the Anglophone Problem to disappear since the former Southern Cameroons well no longer exist as administrative units with the same borders as before the unification of 1961.

2-State federalists: They seek a federal organisation according to the 1961 arrangement… Former Southern Cameroons as a state and Former East Cameroon as a state.

Francophone

The term ‘Francophone’ is used differently by Anglophones and Francophones.

For Francophones, a ‘Francophone’ is a Cameroonian who speaks French.

For Anglophones, ‘Francophone’ is a non-Anglophone where Anglophone is defined at Level 2 and Level 4 in the definition of ‘Anglophone’ above.

This term raises a peculiar curiosity: Francophones define ‘Francophones’ by what they are and Anglophones define them by what they are not. There are reasons for this

First, before 1st October 1961, the people of former East Cameroon were Francophones, Cameroonians and citizens of the Republic of Cameroon (LRC). Before that same date, the people of former West Cameroon were not Francophones, they were Cameroonians but not citizens of the Republic of Cameroon (LRC). The significance of this is that as francophones in the modern configuration of Cameroon, Francophones have never been anything else other than what they are; thus, they define themselves as ‘what they are’. Anglophones have an experience of having another identity and thus define Francophones in terms of ‘what they are not’... their ‘other identity’ being a point of reference.

Second, the curiosity is an expression of a primal assertion by anglophones of their uniqueness; and for francophones, it is an ideological rejection of the political dimension of anglophonism.

Ground Zero

Ground Zero refers to the field of action, the physical space directly affected by the crisis. Because the crisis is also being acted out in the corridors of power in Yaounde, ‘Ground Zero’ is, more specifically, the territory of the North west and South west regions or the physical location (within Cameroon) of activists in the general protest.

The term is modelled from the location of the World Trade Centre after it was attacked in September 2001.

It should be noted that cyberspace has been a major platform of which the crisis has played out. However, beyond cyberspace and cyber activists, there are real men, women and children who directly suffer the effects of school shutdowns, ghost towns, curfews and burnt villages or whose actions and opinions can lead to the loss of their lives or of their freedom. The location of all such persons is referred to as ground Zero.

Hail Hail...
The anthem.

National Integration

Mostly used in its French version “Integration National”. It refers to the social and political process aimed creating a Cameroonian identity on the one hand and on the other, ensuring that all Cameroonians have equal access to opportunity and enjoy all citizens rights wherever they are around the country.

It has been used widely by government officials since the start of the crisis as a counter argument to the idea that the Anglophone identity and cultural heritage is politically unique and to forward the argument that there is something much greater to protect or construct than a colonial legacy.

However, more than the violation in 1972 of article 47 of the 1961 constitution and more than many may know, Integration ranks higher in the hierarchy of “Root Causes” than the said violation. Evidence of this is found in Principle VIII of UN General Assembly Resolution 1541. This Resolution defines three ways (options) in which Trust territories may achieve independence: Independence, Independence by Association, and Independence by Integration.

The first option meant outright independence of the territory;

The second option (Association) meant joining another territory in a federal arrangement;

The third option (Integration) meant fusion with another territory.

It is a well know fact that the first option was not offered. Federalism (1961) and the protection of it (article 47) is proof that Anglophones had the second option (Association) in mind when voted to “achieve independence by joining La République du Cameroun” in the 11th February 1961 referendum. However, in the light of memo written by Jean Pierre Bernard, French Ambassador to Cameroon to Yves Robin, Consul of France in Buea on 8th January 1962, the central government of Yaoundé will interpret the unification as in the spirit of the third option (Integration) and (the French ambassador goes on) it would be in the interest of France to support that interpretation.

That is what explains the violation of Article 47.

That is the sense in which the ‘Integration’ problem ranks higher in the hierarchy of “Root Causes” than the violation of Article 47.

That is why National Integration is government's watchword in addressing and managing the Anglophone Problem.

Leaders

Discourse in the past two years has raised the problem of leadership. It has highlighted the fact that the legality of representation does not necessarily confer legitimacy. Consequently, when Anglophones refer to their leaders or “our leaders"as it is often said, they are not referring to elected mayors, members of parliament our members of government. Rather, they are trying to persons who truly represent their aspirations and from whom they take instructions.

Government's recognition of these extra-institutional leaders has been both a curiosity and determined by political convenience. In late 2016, when it was convenient to limit the grievances to the professional expression of them the leaders were recognised and government dialogued with them. When it became obvious that the professional grievances had political ramifications, that convenience expired the leaders were arrested and the platform from which they coordinated their activities banned.

New persons emerged to fill in the vacuum. They spoke the people's minds, gave orientation to the protest and were acclaimed as leaders. Well… they too were arrested.

Meanwhile, government sent rounds of delegations to communicate its policies to the population and to preach peace and National integration. The slow but constant escalation of the crisis is evidence of the rejection of these institutional representatives as protesters continued to call for the release of their ‘leaders’ and as new leaders continued to emerge.

La Republic (LRC)

Pronounced /la ripʌ’blɪk/. The full form La République du Cameroun (LRC) is used to refer to Cameroon as it is internationally recognized or to the government of Cameroon.

More specifically and in terms of territory, it refers to the territory of former East Cameroon, to the territory that was administered by the French before 1st October 1960 and following up from Fon Gorji Dinka’s theory (presented above under the entry “Ambazonia”), La République captures the discontent over the change of the official name of the country from United Republic of Cameroon to The Republic of Cameroon (La Republique du Cameroun) in 1984.

As such, the expression “La République”, when used by protesters is a political statement and IS NOT used in its English equivalent.

LETSI (also a luta continua)

LETSI stands for ‘Let the Struggle Intensify’. It's usually used at the end of a comment or an opinion on the crisis and is meant both to indicate the users commitment to the cause and to call on other persons to stay committed.

Other expressions used with a similar meaning as LETSI is ‘a luta continua’ and 'Ahead Ahead'. ‘A luta continua’ was promoted principally Boh Herbert, a journalist formerly of the national broadcaster CRTV, currently resident in the USA and leader of MoRISC (Movement for the Restoration of the Independence of Southern Cameroons). Early on in the crisis, Boh Herbert wrote and published many editorials which he read out with a signature finale ‘A Luta Continua’

NoSo

NoSo is an abbreviation of “Regions du Nord Ouest et du Sud Ouest” (North West and South West).

It is generally used (written) within the Francophone community to refer to the zones most affected by the crisis.

It should be noted that in mid-2017, within the logic of National Integration (entered above) a government order instructed public officials not to use the expression ‘Anglophone Regions’ but to refer to North West and South West Regions. Whether the coinage of ‘NoSo’ has anything to do with that order is uncertain.

Odeshi

Odeshi is a Nigerian fetish thought to render combattants impenetrable by bullets. When the crisis escalated into armed violence, it was rumoured that armed combatants had entered into Cameroonian territory and/or that some Cameroonians were seen with red armed bands around their heads or arms. These combatants were said to be Odeshi fighters or Odeshi boys.

Nigerian tales record that they are fearless, unattainable by firearms and are reported to have played a part in maritime insecurity around the Gulf of Guinea.

Other reports contest their impenetrable attributes. However ‘Odeshi’ has become a word recognizable to and used by many to refer to a particular group of militant fighters.

One and indivisible

“One and indivisible" is an expression used in Article 1.2 of the 1996 constitution of Cameroon. It has been used write extensively in the past two years as the basic normative standard that invalidates calls for separation/secession.

However the expression raises numerous issues:

First, one would assume that “one and indivisible” is a reference to the UNITY of the country. Yet, the country ‘stopped’ being UNITED in 1984. This curiosity brings home the fact that beyond a difference in grammatical category between UNITY (noun) and UNITED (adjective), both terms are substantively different in Cameroon. While UNITED (contained in the official name of the country until 1984) was a reference to political history, UNITY suggested by “one and indivisible” is an aspiration - though one to which not all Cameroonians subscribe. Notice that those who contest the idea of “one and indivisible” also argue that the change of name from ‘United Republic of Cameroon’ to ‘Republic of Cameroon’ is one of the causes of the crisis. This suggests that fundamentally, the contestation may not be about UNITY but about recognition of history.

Second, in an article titled “Cameroon is One and Indivisible: Which Cameroon?” (January 2017), Barrister Akere Muna reminds that Cameroon or parts of it has been variously known through history as Kamerun, Southern Cameroons, West Cameroon, East Cameroon, La Republique du Cameroun etc; and that the indifference to or non-recognition of the grievances raised by teachers and lawyers in the months leading up to 2017 is evidence that there is an ‘official Cameroon’ and the ‘real Cameroon’. This reminder highlights the fact that whether ‘one and indivisible’ refers to the people(s) or to the territory(ies) of Cameroon, the unity that underlies the expression (One and Indivisible) must never be considered as a given but as work-in-progress. Perhaps this is why Akere Muna concludes that “If we want to consolidate our unity, it is the real Cameroon we must face. We must talk to one another, frankly, truthfully, and transparently. If we continue to stay in denial, then we will never be united, the divisions will continue, and we will lose the peace we so dearly cherish.

Third, notice that article 1.1 of the constitution of independent La Republique du Cameroun (4th March 1960) describes the country as ‘One and Indivisible’. Notice that the territory referred to in that constitution is altered with the events of 1st October 1961. Also notice that in the Federal Constitution of 1961, the expression ‘one and indivisible’ does not feature. Finally, notice that Article 47 of the Federal constitution stated that the federal form of the state was inviolable, yet was violated in 1972. Lessons learnt from these are as follows:

• A country described as “one and indivisible” can gain territory
• Cameroon did not lose territory after 1961 when the ‘one and indivisible’ clause was removed from the constitution.
• A country’s ‘one and indivisible’ status is alterable
• Even inviolable clauses in a constitution are violable.

Cameroonians have grappled with these issues enough in the past two years for the expression to gain a place in this repertoire.

Our People

“Our People” is used mainly by activists who champion the cause for the protection of the Anglo-saxon heritage that Southern Cameroonians brought into ‘the Union’.

When the term is used by these activists, it does not refer to the entire people of Cameroon but specifically to the Anglophone community. The usage resonates the use of ‘our leaders’ entered above and captures the deep fissure that exists between the peoples of the territories referred to in Article 1.1 of the Federal constitution of 1961 as well as the frailty of nationhood on which the state is built.

Root Causes

Original causes. Fundamental causes. The expression is used to refer to political actions, omissions and contortions that have resulted in marginalisation, assimilation and the gradual but systematic adulteration or disappearance of the anglophone educational and judicial systems in particular and the anglophone community management and approach to politics in general.

It seemed clear from the very onset of the crisis that the government was keen on giving  a particular spin on the problem. As a result:

• Government insisted that the grievances raised were strictly professional. Thus, efforts were made to dialogue with teachers and lawyers separately and to provide sectorial solutions to the grievances. The crisis escalated.
• Government positioned the grievances as a problem of distribution of resources. Thus, a grant of two billion francs was offered to support private schools in the anglophone sub-system. The crisis escalated further.
• Government decided that the problem was about access to opportunity. Thus, bilingual teachers were recruited and a Common Law section opened at the National School for Administration and Magistracy. The crisis escalated even further.
• Then the problem was posed as a public security issue. Thus, leaders were arrested and the Anglophone regions militarised. The crisis intensified and arson started.
• Government suggested that the population was satisfied with the measures taken but that they were being manipulated by enemies of the country most of whom were abroad. Thus, along came the internet shut-down, delegations of elites sent to talk to the populations, delegations sent abroad to explain the government’s good will and solutions offered to Cameroonians abroad. Tensions heightened, reached boiling point on first October 2017 and protesters intensified communication on the crisis in foreign capitals. At home, violence increased by both sides. Dozens of civilians were killed and many security posts and public buildings attacked by militant groups.
• It was suggested that it was a problem of access by Anglophones to certain positions of power. Thus, Anglophones were appointed to key positions that had hitherto been the preserve of Francophones. The crisis went on.
• Government decided that it was a terrorism problem and declared war on terrorism.

In all this, protesters have been heard alluding to:

1. The violation of Article 47 of the constitution of 1961
2. The non-completion/non/respect of Article 102 of the United Nations Charter
3. The issues associated to the change of the country’s name in 1984
4. The gradual, systematic and perhaps programmed disappearance of the Anglophone heritage and assimilation of Anglophones

These points alluded to, constitute what Anglophones refer to as Root Causes.

Referring to the solutions offered by government and listed above, many have asked why government has done ‘so much’ yet the protests have continued and escalated. Some have said that Anglophones are ungrateful.

Regarding the first remark, the protests have continued and escalated because symptoms of a problem have been glossed over without any attempts made to address the Root Causes.

Regarding the second remark, Anglophones are not ungrateful. They're left with the feeling that they've received what they neither needed nor asked for and all what they ask (Root Causes) has been systematically ignored.

Secession/Separation/Restoration

By October - November 2016, the crisis was about marginalisation and that gradual dilution of the Anglophone sub-systems of education and legal practice.

By December 2016, it emerged that the form of the state was inextricably linked to the grievances as hitherto presented. thus, federalism was floated.

By March-April 2017, anglophone leaders had been arrested, the internet shut down in the two anglophone regions, the anglophone regions was unusually high military presence and some leaders fled. This created a leadership vacuum that secessionists hurried to fill in.

The logic of secessionists was not readily acceptable to all anglophones. Some thought it was not necessary. Some thought it was not possible. Some perceived it as a blackmail card. As a result, arguments were made that pointed to the fact that secession was not an exact synonym of separation nor of restoration.

It must be said that the final objective of secessionists is similar to that of separatists. The difference lies in the legal argument that leads to that objective. The logic of Restoration is slightly different (see: http://harryacha.blogspot.com/2018/02/form-of-state-stakes-in-2018.html)

However, the socio-linguistic reality is that in Cameroon in June 2018, people are talking about secession, separation and restoration either by association, accusation or rejection.

Struggle

The term ‘Struggle’ ranks amongst the most widely used in these last two years. It is used as an affectionate term to refer to efforts to affirm and restore the place of the anglophone community as a political entity in the political establishment within the spirit of the 1961 constitution.

Some generic definitions of the term ‘Struggle” are

“a forceful or violent effort to get free of restraint or resist attack” OR “a determined effort under difficulties”.

Perhaps these definitions are indicative of the of the knowledge that anglophones had (intrinsically or conveyed from past generations) of the difficulties and complexities that would be involved in obtaining the political recognition that they sought. They also reveal the determination to sustain the effort even if that included doing themselves violence. Ghost towns and school shut down were amongst such self inflicted violence at least to the extent that their duration was measured and objectively evaluated.

It is interesting to note that within the wider socio-linguistic evolution, “The struggle” is used by anglophones to refer to the same reality generalised by non-anglophones as “la crise” (the crisis); and who uses the term ‘struggle’ or appropriates it, constitutes a line of demarcation that divides the ‘official Cameroon from the real Cameroon’

Takumbeng

The Takumbeng came to the limelight on 22 September 2017 when tens of thousands of people in the North West and South West Regions came out to protest the militarization, indiscriminate arrests and simmering violence that were visiting in the regions.

Though that day's protests (referred to as the Takumbeng March) across towns and cities in the regions were done by both men and women, they were led by women who were either naked or loosely clad.

The TAKUMBENG is a women's protest movement that has its roots in the present day North West Region of Cameroon. There are traces of similar movements in the wider grassfield area and stretching into the South West Region.

Some records hold that the term TAKUMBENG means “father of thunder". The father of thunder was amongst the most revered and feared deities. The narrative holds that since the human manifestation of the deity was through women, logic would have demanded that the term be MAKUMBENG… “the mother of thunder”. Others say that the idea of Father of Thunder embodied by women completes the man/woman dimensions of humanity.

Other records hold that only elderly women could be part of the TAKUMBENG. Or if a young woman was accepted into the fold, she had to be a titled woman or be DIRECTLY affected by the injustice that had provoked the activation of the group. They were initiated in secret chambers or bushes and when they came out, they held a special leaf between their lips and only murmured chants of sadness as they processed. Men were not allowed to speak to them once they completed their initiation and until they completed their mission.

Literature is not abundant on the history and development of the movement. But oral tradition and some later writings relay some interesting information.

1. The TAKUMBENG was widely used in the colonial period to combat the colonial authorities when it seemed impossible to hold sway by means of armed confrontation.
2. The TAKUMBENG are a kind of juju (deity) and ranks among the most secret, sacred and venerated institutions in the local traditions.
3. Like any other highly respected deity or cult group (the TAKUMBENG being more of the latter), it is activated only rarely. In fact, in recent history, after the colonial period, their only major appearance was in the 1990s when, in heat of a political uprising, the army that had been dispatched to keep the peace committed ferocious kidnapping, rape, theft and torture, driving women, children and men into the arms of terror. Their appearance on that occasion galvanised the militants for change and forced the troops to be more measured in their engagement or to retreat, albeit for a while.
4. Their appearance was a last resort move... when dialogue had failed, administrative procedure had failed and war had either failed or the thought of it seemed suicidal. As such, it was an invocation of the gods and the spirits to sanction human deviance and restore justice.
5. It was a matter for women only. Men were either not associated or when they were, they walked a few hundred metres behind the women.
6. In groups that could range from twenty to hundreds, the women would march to "the enemy" fearlessly, with no weapons singing songs of sadness or protest. When they approached "the enemy", they raised their clothing and exposed their nudity. This act was a curse so grave that the enemy, if they knew the tradition, would cover their heads, turn away from the nudity and flee.

Some records hold that depending on the perceived crime of the enemy, the women would also publicly urinate and defecate at the location of the encounter with the enemy.

It is also recorded that if the enemy did not make amends within one week, very bad things would happen to them depending on the curse that had been pronounced.

(For full article on the Takumbeng, visit: http://harryacha.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-takumbeng-march.html?m=1)

Terrorist

‘Terrorist’ has become a tag that both feuding sides use to refer to each other.

On the one hand, government uses the terrorist tag on assailants to justify the use of military force in what would otherwise be a public security issue for which the police would be responsible. The Minister of communications and other government officials are known to have used the tag often. The official document which detailed the government's humanitarian relief plan also made abundant use of the term.

On the other hand, armed groups also refer to government forces as ‘terrorist army’.

There is a great extent to which the conflict has been a war of words and tags. And on the particular case of the terrorist tag, it would have been appropriate to refer to the law on terrorism to decide who is a terrorist. However, this comes along with three main difficulties:

• Though the law must be considered as the legal standard and reference, the terrorism law was largely contested on the grounds of the ease with which it can be used to counter legitimate political contention.
• For most of 2017, the fact that persons such as Barrister Agbor Balla and Dr. Neba Fontem were attributed the terrorist tag though the current circumstances prove that their positions were quite moderate, blurs the whole notion of terrorism.
• If the surge in violence, arson, and attacks on military personnel and positions are responses to unresolved social, political and economic grievances or to provocation (real or perceived) or to excessive use of force by the military then, as we said elsewhere, there is a public security problem, not a terrorist problem.

Tigers (also Vipers, Dragons)

Tigers, Vipers and Dragons are the most prominent of names by which groups that have taken up arms. It is unclear where exactly they are located, whether their activities are coordinated or whether there's is a central command for all of them.
 

It is on record that some of the groups have taken responsibility for or been attributed some acts of violence or kidnappings. It is also thought that some of these groups started as community protection initiatives against the violence (real or perceived) of security forces. The fact that they started as community initiatives may explain why locations such as Manyu Tigers or Lebialem Dragons are parts of their names.
 

Whatever the organisational structures or locations of these groups are, their names have taken a place in the in the lexic of the past two years.

Water na Water

Water na Water literally translates as Water is Water”. It became very popular in mid-2018 and is more popularly written as Wata na Wata and hashtagged as WNW.
 

By mid-2018, the crisis had escalated to a point where constituted armed groups exchanged gunfire with the ‘regular’ army. Prior to this period, engagement had evolved from sporadic ambushes on security positions in the hinterlands to bold challenges in town and cities. The first of such challenges took place in the South West Region. Militants turned up in a busy street on motorbike and challenged the military to  to come out and face them if they dared. The slogan “Water na Water” could be heard distinctly and repeatedly as if it was a rallying call. It seemed clear to most that that was a game changing moment. In fact, events in the days and weeks that followed (exchange of gunfire in Buea, Muea, Ekona and Bamenda) proved that it represented a major shift in strategy and engagement.
 

Social media actors took up the slogan and it went viral. Some posted it as endnote on their postings, as a taunt against the contradictors or call for mobilisation.

However, not many know or are ready to say what it means or, indeed, what the etymology is.

Some say it is an adaptation of the popular expression “all water di quench fire”; meaning “all water (clean or dirty) can put out a fire”.

When the populations in the crisis affected zones started showing their resentment for the security forces and their hesitance to cooperate with them in information gathering and basic hospitality. It was rumoured that some villages ‘tampered’ with water sources and made them not safe to drink by soldiers and other security officers who, in the main, were not local. Water na water thus meant that since ‘water is water’, security units were welcome to drink any water available.

Others refer to the idea that all water can put out a fire and say that the government declared war on them and they’ll fight the war with the means (any means) available to them after all, ‘water is water’.

Some sources say that the slogan is a prescription from a local fetish that renders combatants invulnerable while others refer to Tanganyika rebellion against German oppression in the early 1900s, also known as the Maji Maji Rebellion. In the early 1900s, local groups used poisoned arrows and magical powers from a water fetish to fight the Germans… hence “Maji" which stands for water. Maji Maji became a code for these insurgents, a code which has been adapted to “water na water”.

All these seem far fetched. In fact, persons who use the expression seem to find pleasure in sustaining the myth around the origin and meaning of the expression.

A simple survey with the question “what is the meaning of Water na Water?” provided the following responses

• Why do you want to know
• I am not telling you
• Go find it for yourself
• Make of it what you want, after all, Water na Water
• Water na Water

Consequently, though some may differ with me on what is most suitable to say about the meaning of the expression, it is most convenient for me to say:

Water na Water = Wata na Wata; where “I am not telling” you may (or may not mean) “I don’t know”.

Harry ACHA
June 2018