FORM OF THE STATE - THE STAKES IN 2018

In 2011, 77.9% of Cameroonians re-elected incumbent President Paul Biya for a mandate of seven years as President of the Republic of Cameroon on the CPDM ticket. Amongst the 23 candidates on the starting blocks at the start of the race, the following figured among the top six:

John Fru Ndi – 10.7%,

Garga Haman Adji – 3.2%,

Adamou Ndam Njoya – 1.7%

Paul Ayah Abine – 1.2% closely followed by

Edith Kahbang Walla (aka Kah Walla) with 0.72%.

CPDM party was already in the cockpit when Decentralisation came into the Cameroon constitution in 1996. Though it had not become effective 15 years later in 2011, Decentralisation was the CPDM’s offer ahead of the elections and for which its candidate was elected.

In the past two years, the SDF party has argued that its offer is federalism. Not many people are sure that they remember hearing the SDF party singing the federalist song ahead of the 2011 elections. In fact, former SDF militant Abel Elimbi Lobe has argued that federalism has never featured in the SDF program or Manifesto and that their claim to being in favour of federalism is a political expediency aimed at benefiting from the traction created by the Anglophone crisis.

The form of the state was not a major factor in determining the sway of votes in those elections though. Six years down the line and a few months to the end of the mandate, the form of the state has become a major bone of contention in a political arena that has known significant changes in personalities, groups and issues that preoccupy the electorate.

The Anglophone crisis has alerted the electorate to the fact that many of the political, economic and social issues that preoccupy Cameroonians and that would otherwise be the issues that sway the vote one way or another can be brought together under the canopy of the form of the state. The crisis has raised awareness on the causal relationship between extreme centralization and socio-economic development and political stability. Consequently, the political map of Cameroon is being redrawn. Actors, political parties and pressure groups are redefining themselves and packaging their messages in such a way that states their vision not only for solutions to the Anglophone problem, but also of the form of the state and how that form would better address social and economic issues. Even then, the options are many...

 

1. Unitarists

Unitarists are adepts of the official version of the history of Cameroon. Their starting point is the acceptance of the official narrative of German rule – French and British Trusteeships – Independence of French Cameroon (1960) – Independence/Reunification (1961) – Unification – Consolidation (1984) – Decentralisation. This group has two sub-groups: the Biyaists and the progressists

a. Biyaists

Biyaists are the purists of the official narrative. Although the foundation of their perception stems from the regime of the former Head of State, Amadou Ahidjo, it is important to refer to them as Biyaists not only because most of those who defend this position refer to themselves as such but also because what we have referred to above as Consolidation and Decentralisation are products of the Biya regime. Also, there is sufficient evidence to show that in the Ahidjo regime, there was a conscious effort to recognize TWO PEOPLES in the form of the state.

They argue that Decentralisation is effective in Cameroon and is the way forward for the long term political stability of Cameroon. They would settle for nothing else and though they are may lose a few sympathizers from their ranks to the progressists, they are also likely to recruit from progressists.

b. Progressists

Progressists are also adepts of the official narrative of Cameroon’s history. They argue that Decentralisation is the way forward but that the pace of implementation is slow and often suggestive of a lack of political will to fully implement the option.

 Most of them recognise that the Anglophone problem is the consequence of hyper centralization. They do not often refer to Anglophones as a people in line with the 1961 – 1972 configuration. Rather, they are likely to refer to Anglophones as a sociological composite of the same value and political rank as any of the many ethnic groups in Cameroon.

Some are likely to be sympathetic to federalism but would not support it for fear that it may open the door to separation in the long term. As such, they would not consider federalism unless it is a ten-state federation in line with the current ten regions or if the lines of the federal state erase the pre-1961 lines.

 Like the Biyaists, progressists do not see the events of 1961 as a reunification of two independent states but as a process by which pre-1961 La Republique du Cameroun regained a territory it had lost or was amputated by foreign administration.

 They are likely to win supporters from the Biyaists but also to lose some to them. When they entertain the thought of federalism, they are four state federalists.

 2. Federalists

In general, federalists think that Cameroon should remain united but that the levels of devolution of power must be much more than decentralization can offer. There are three federalist postures

a. Two state

Two state federalists define the lines of a possible federation along the lines of the configuration of 1961-1972. They argue that there are irreconcilable differences between the cultural, governance and administrative traditions inherited from the British and the French. They think that the macro economy, diplomacy and defence of Cameroon have greater promise if the Former West Cameroon and Former East Cameroon stuck together. They contest the concept of national integration which, operationally, is lived as assimilation and as such, they fiercely defend their right to protect the educational and legal traditions inherited from the British. They insist that federalism is neither a division of the country nor is it a pathway to division.

 b. Four state

Four state federalists perceive their offer as innovative and as a midpoint between the two-state federalists and adepts of decentralization.  The discourse of this group seems to reveal that considering the current atmosphere of tension, federalism is inevitable but does not resolve the close attachment that Anglophones have with the British traditions they inherited. As such, their vision is to group the present North West and West Regions together, group the South West and Littoral Regions together, group the Centre, South and East Regions together and group the Adamawa, North and Far North Regions together. This offer would satisfy the call for federalism along cultural lines that precede the administration of the British and the French but also, in the long term, dilute the bond between the English speaking regions.

 Four-state federalists may recruit from progressive unitarists but may lose followers to ten-state federalists.

 c. Ten state

Ten-state federalists either think that decentralization has failed or that there has never been sufficient political will to fully implement it. They are quite similar to unitary progressists. The lines along which they define their federalist offer are the same as current regions and they offer just a little more federal autonomy than the project of decentralization does. Their detractors have argued that the ten-state posture is one that derives from political convenience… that is, an attempt to garner support from the growing interest in federalism without being associated with failing decentralization and without being identified with two-state federalists.

 3. Separatists

Separatists are found within the Anglophones ranks. They seek to detach the territory and population of the North West and South West Regions (or former West Cameroon) and create a new sovereign state called Ambazonia. They recognize the UN sponsored plebiscite of 1961 in which Southern Cameroons (SC) became independent by “joining” La Republique du Cameroun (LRC) that had become independent in 1960. However, they argue that LRC, which was already a member of the United Nations by the time of the Plebiscite, did not register a treaty that would have sealed the union between LRC and SC in accordance with Article 102 of the United nations Charter.

 Note… Article 102 of the UN Charter states that “Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it”.

In their opinion therefore, the present configuration of the state of Cameroon as it is known and internationally recognized is illegal.

 Their numbers have grown significantly in the past 18 months. They are likely to swap sympathizers with restorationists and though their numbers are only likely to rise amongst the Anglophone population, a greater number of people are researching the facts for themselves and are making the case not by followership but by conviction.

 4. Restorationists

Restorationists are also found within Anglophone ranks. They aspire to independence like separatists. However, their argument is based on what they say is the violation of article 47 of the 1961 constitution. In their opinion, the referendum of 1972 was illegal and the decision to rename the country “the Republic of Cameroon” in 1984 was a de facto secession from an incomplete process of reunification.

 The term “Restorationists” therefore comes from the opinion that in 1984, LRC RESTORED its independence and they seek (in like manner) to RESTORE the independence of Southern Cameroons.

Some analysts include in this category, persons who recall that the United Nations did not offer Southern Cameroons a third option… the option of outright independence. To them, Restoration refers to the restoration of “initial fairness”.

 Like separatists, Restorationists are not likely to recruit outside the Anglophone folk. However, many more Anglophones are taking ownership of the argument.

It must be said that there is no fundamental difference between separatists and Restorationists and some have referred to both under the general banner of Independentists. Or, if any, it is that separatists hope to achieve their objective through international pressure since they see the problem as non-respect of an international norm; while Restorationists hope to achieve their objective through internal processes.

 5. Secessionists

Secessionists are also mostly found amongst the Anglophone community. They seek to create a new state on the territory of the former Southern Cameroon for the simple reason that they argue that Anglophones are greatly and systematically marginalized in Cameroon. They deplore the economic situation of Cameroon in general and of the Anglophone regions in particular and think that they would be better off if they were autonomous at least or sovereign at best.

 They are cloned descendants of persons who were opposed to the YES vote in favour of Southern Cameroons achieving independence by association to LRC in the plebiscite of 1961. They are either not aware of the technicalities that underpin the arguments of Separatists and Restorationists or simply don’t care about the arguments. Because they do not have any legal arguments to call for a break away (or think they don't need any), it is easy to tag them with unjustified intent to tamper with the territorial integrity of Cameroon and thus make a criminal case against them.

6. Alleged Terrorists

This category is complex, and so for many reasons

• Of all the categories cited above, it is possible to find people who can declare that they belong to each given category. This is not the case with the ‘terrorist’ category. We are not aware that anyone of those tagged as terrorists would define themselves as such.
• If terrorism is a criminal offence (as it is) and inscribed in the law... If anyone can only be termed terrorist after due judicial process where they are found guilty… If no-one has been found guilty yet especially on matters related to the form of the state, then there are no terrorists. In fact, when persons such as Barrister Agbor Balla and Dr. Neba Fontem have been attributed the terrorist tag, the whole notion of terrorism becomes blurred.
• If the surge in violence, arson, and attacks on military personnel and positions are responses to unresolved social, political and economic grievances or to provocation (real or perceived) or to excessive use of force by the military, then there is a public security problem, not a terrorist problem.

Some would see these arguments as academic and would opine that acts or terrorism, or acts akin to terrorism (to say the least) have been witnessed and that someone would have to answer for them. Granted... albeit from a purely normative outlook. However, more practically, the following difficulties exist:

• If 6-c. above is the very definition of self-defence the question remains… who determines the legitimacy of self-defence.
• Can the determination of the legitimacy of self-defence be envisaged from the same establishment that recognises the monopoly of legitimate violence to the side against which self-defence became inevitable?

These are delicate matters and their implications for the continued survival, stability and wellbeing of the State are such that political bargaining should override the potential pathologies of juridicism.

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BEYOND IDEOLOGY

We started off talking about how Cameroonians voted in 2011. We talked about what the parties and persons they voted for stood for on the question of the form of the state. We also suggested that though most of the issues that determined the vote in 2011 (health services, cost of living, unemployment, infrastructure, governance etc) will still be determinant in the 2018 elections, these factors are seen through the prism of the form of the state.

 If the question in 2011 was which platform had an economic vision (for example) that was likely to improve on the performance of the economy, in 2018, the question has become… Which political platform in proposing a form of the state that will itself (by the very mechanisms of that form) engender economic growth by reducing impunity, the effects of self-interest and the impact of the incompetences of individuals? This change in paradigm is, in fact, reminiscent of President Obama’s appeal for African countries to have strong institutions and not strong men.

 In an article titled “The Anglophone problem” (http://harryacha.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-anglophone-problem-past-few-weeks.html) we suggested that the form of a state is a mutable constituted structure that allows and engineers dialogue and communion amongst individuals, between sociological groups, between generations, between people and their history and between people and their future. We concluded that: “if the form of the state is not such that its mechanisms guarantee productive dialogue, then questions over the usefulness of that form are legitimate”.

 In another article titled: “A State Short of a Nation” (http://harryacha.blogspot.com/2018/01/a-state-short-of-nation_8.html) we discussed the complexities, misunderstanding and (sometimes) misrepresentation of Cameroon’s sociological groups and suggested that one of the major obstacles to the efficiency of the state is the fact that the state is not built on a homogenous nation or vision of a nation that is acceptable most.

In an article titled “L’Etat Unitaire ne peut pas Vaincre la Secession Anglophone” (https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1685687451492869&id=100001548900808), Dr. Dieudonne Essomba argues that up to 20% of a population cannot be compelled to adhere to a model (referring to the form of the state) that it does not want. He reminds that the state only exists through institutions, schools, hospitals, courts etc and that when a given community ‘rejects’ the state, it starts to destroy the state systematically through its symbols and through civil disobedience.

 It is not clear at this time what the impact of increased awareness on the relationship between the form of the state and economic growth or social welfare may be in the consultations scheduled for 2018. Inasmuch as the ‘battle line’ is clear on matters related to the form of the state amongst the intelligentsia and political elite, it is not obvious that the lines are equally clear amongst the bulk of the electorate. What seems clear is that the matter has taken pride of place on the political agenda and will keep that place until consensus is reached… and there is some evidence for this:

1. The fact that the Head of State prescribed the acceleration of the process of decentralisation in his address to Cameroonians on 31st December 2017 testifies that even amongst the purest or unitarists, the need to adjust to a popular clamour is felt.
2. The events of the past 18 months have shown that neither arrests nor the use of force can bring a population to adhere to a model of governance that is contrary to the very essence of its culture, history and aspirations.
3. There is evidence that increased knowledge of history in general and the events of 1960-1961, 1972 and 1984 in particular is causing an increasing number of people to make independent and informed decisions on their preferred mode of government.
4. The fact that there are persons in high positions of the state apparatus who had endured years of restrictions to their freedoms because they were associated with, or thought to have been associated with the military coup of 1984 suggests not only that such persons are not in a good position to declare who the state will or won’t speak to but also that regardless of the crimes for which people are accused, the state eventually reconciles with its own.

 

CONCLUSION

Elections are amongst the most important moments in the life of a country. They are times when a population embraces its history with approval or chastisement and speaks to its future with hope and abnegation.

 In 2018, the stakes will be high as Cameroonians will be called upon to elect officials for local government, legislative representation and for the highest executive office of the land… if the electoral calendar is respected. They will be called upon to do so in a context of insecurity and a context where political evolution has thrust to the top of the political agenda the question of which form of state is most appropriate for the management of the country’s diversity and resources. They’ll be called upon to choose their leaders and representatives at a time when divisions are so deep and juridicism so rigid that violence has become a mode of political expression. They will be called upon to commit the state and its immediate future to the agendas of persons and political platforms who will have to manage an increasingly divergent spectrum of opinions on the history and hierarchy of sociological groups that make up Cameroon.

These will be hard decisions, but as they are made, each voter will have to remember that in the recent past, our disagreements have caused the terms ‘Genocide’ and ‘Cameroon’ to be used (rightly or wrongly) in the same breath. They’ll have to remember that violence emanating from disagreements over perception of the country’s history have caused thousands of Cameroonians to flee from their country and live as refugees in a not-too-endowed part of a neighbouring country.

 Like in 2011, they will have Decentralisation as an option… They’ll have to question the the track record of Decentralisation 22 years after its introduction into the constitution.

They will have federalism as an option…  they'll have decide between three types, question the relevance and potential efficiency of each, and assess the potential of each variety to permanently resolve the currently ambient crisis of identity and management of diversity.

 While voters will not be voting for separation or for the creation of a new country (Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia) they’ll have to pay attention to the arguments raised by separatists and restorationists and choose platforms that would definitely put the contentions to bed lest they be simply put on hold and open the possibility for them to re-emerge at a later date… perhaps in less compromising fashion.

Restorationists and separatists will have to decide whether to take part in the debates leading up to the elections and thus have an opportunity to make their case heard or whether they will boycott the process and let the matter and their fate be decided by people who do not fully understand their plight. They will have to decide whether to take a unilateral path to the satisfaction of their aspirations despite their demographic disadvantage or whether they want to make some political progress and yet leave open the possibility to continue making their case.

 Finally, THE NUMBERS… At this moment, it seems that the number of voters who do not fully understand the stakes involved in the 2018 polls and the relationship between the form of the state and economic welfare / political stability is larger than the number of votes needed to win an outright majority in the municipal, legislative and presidential elections. This means that it is possible to “win” any or all of the four scheduled elections without recognising or fully addressing the real issues that are tearing Cameroonians apart, causing some to flee the country and live as refugees or most unfortunately, causing them to kill each other. However, the ability to “win”without addressing these issues and yet choosing to address them IN TRUTH is what will make the difference between politicians and statesmen.