THE FRANCOPHONE CRISIS

Recently, I came across an Article titled “La fausse Crise Anglophone” (loosely translated as “The fake Anglophone Crisis) by I-don’t-know-who. I read the article and by the end I realized that the focus of the writer was on a perceived selective indignation over two events that he held at par. The article compared the public outrage that followed the killing of 5 year old Carolouise Ndialle by a law enforcement officer in Buea on 14th October 2021 with (what the author suggests) was public indifference to the killing by separatists (says the author) of Alain Jocker in Bamenda two weeks later, and concludes on the hypocrisy of Cameroonians.

The article did not say in what way the events described contributed to what would be a “fausse crise Anglophone” nor did it address anything even remotely connected to the substance or causes of the situation in Cameroon.

There are two possible explanations for this discrepancy. Either the article was published before it was completed or the urge to make an ideological point was stronger than the ability to make a worthwhile analysis. Many such ideology-based arguments have made a place for themselves in what would otherwise be healthy discourse of the crises plaguing Cameroon.

Former MP Marlyse Douala Bell, for example, argued that all along, the Anglophone grievances and posture vis-à-vis the state were a con. She said that Anglophone representatives changed their demands each time the government met the demands and concluded that the grievances expressed by teachers and lawyers were smokescreens that covered the endpoint that is currently fully expressed either through federalists or separatists. Such opinions have been held by other hawkish actors intent on deflecting from the root causes of the problem.

In the early days of the crisis Professor Matthias Eric Owona Nguini argued that the grievances were either a poorly masked manoeuvre ultimately aimed at taking power or if not, at least have leverage over any eventual winner of the presidential elections of 2018. The lifespan of this argument expired after the elections when no serious connection could be made between the grievances and any candidate’s agenda. Professsor Owona Nguini may not have believed in what he said but he surely knew too well what happens in Cameroon to anyone who makes a serious challenge to take over power… and that knowledge may have motivated the orientation of his analysis.

Such political posturing is rife on the Cameroonian scene and constitutes the interest of this article. I will argue that the idea of an “anglophone crisis” is indeed fake. Also, I will share the opinion that through the use of the expression “anglophone crisis” the Francophone community is projecting its own insecurities on the Anglophone community and consequently, that the real crisis plaguing Cameroon is a FRANCOPHONE CRISIS. I'll conclude that in Cameroon, there's an Anglophone Problem and a Francophone Crisis.

1. FAKE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS

The term ‘Anglophone crisis’ has been widely used in the current circumstances and I twitch each time I hear it. In my opinion, anglophones have a problem in Cameroon that has resulted in a crisis for the country or better still, has resulted in a crisis in the relationship between the country’s constituent parts.

In fact, anglophones are at peace with themselves, with what they stand for, with the values they uphold and with the role that they should play in the progress of the experiment of unification. In this sense, the idea that the Anglophone crisis is a ‘fake’ is true.

However, it must be noted that some persons use the expressions “anglophone crisis” and “Anglophone Problem” interchangeably as though they meant the same thing. Even there, the idea of a ‘Fake Anglophone Problem” (if the author referred to above intended to delegitimize the ‘root causes’) would be an extension of a false narrative… the misrepresentation of grievances between 2016 and 2021 as attributed to Marlyse Douala Bell above. Although it is true that the list of grievances could be seen to be different from one point in the disturbances to another, it is important to note that these differences were due to maturation not mutation.

In an opinion I shared in 2016, I argued that the grievances posed at the time would mature and that measures that could calm down tensions at the end of 2016 will not be seen to be sufficient two or three years later.

Barrister Agbor Balla made a similar argument when he said that though the government was forbidding anyone from talking about federalism, a time will come when the government will itself offer the federal option and the Anglophone community would not find it adequate.

These lead me to the conclusion that there are ideological postures and deficiencies in the management and governance of socio-professional communities, resources, access to opportunities and the national identity (or what is left of it) that have led to the projection of a ‘crisis’ on the Anglophone community. Such projection is a recognized tendency in psychology where a subject unconsciously takes unwanted emotions or traits they do not like about themselves and attributes them to someone else. The classic example is the cheating spouse who constantly accuses their partner of infidelity. In this light, the idea of an Anglophone crisis is actually indicative of a deep Francophone crisis that is either unavowed or known but unassumed.

2. THE FRANCOPHONE CRISIS

There are many indications that a deep Francophone crisis exists in Cameroon

2.1. Francophone Identity Crisis

The Francophone crisis of identity is complex and should be understood from the perspective of the territorial and cultural Francophone. Before 1961, La Republique du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons were separate political entities. They developed/acquired such different political cultures and attitudes to public management that the mergence in 1961 could not blot. While Anglophones participated in governing their territory, Francophones were governed by or subjected to the tutelage.

Consequently, for Anglophones, self-governance, priority to local government, participation in government, parliamentary democracy and accountability are a reflex and a political identity. For Francophones, because the French superimposed a model of government that did not favour (meaning: did not tolerate) local input, the reflex in government after the departure of the French was to try to replicate what they had seen ‘their master’ do. This does not only result in the imposition or experimentation of a political system that is not at one with local customs, but also demonstrates a severe lack of socio-political identity in the Francophone community. It is in this regard that the refusal to recognise the political identity of Anglophones by Francophones is actually a projection upon Anglophones of a Francophone identity crisis.

Various ideas have been floated in an attempt to create a coherent identity that would, at the same time, portray the Francophones as homogenous and (this is important) dilute the Anglophone identity.

2.1.1. German Colonial Reference

Reference is made to the German colonial era by Francophone revisionists to suggest that the period of British tutelage was a passing parenthesis by which a part of Cameroon cannot define itself considering that what became La Republique du Cameroon and Southern Cameroons were part of the German Kamerun. This argument has two flaws:

Firstly, the fact of a German colonial era cannot negate the influence that the British had on what became Southern Cameroons nor the fact that descendants of that heritage choose to identify with it.

Secondly, the suggestion of a recreation of an identity based on the German colonial territory potentially creates a diplomatic headache since that territory included parts of Gabon, parts of the Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea. These countries would be in their right to suspect Cameroon of making early moves to an eventual absorption. If such fears do not explain why these countries are hesitant to fully engage in a free trade zone, at least it explains why the German era is not a safe reference on which a modern Cameroonian political identity can be built.

2.1.2. Bantu Reference

In their effort to determine a political and cultural identity that covers the entire territory of modern Cameroon and dilute the Anglophone identity in the process, Francophone ideologues have also forwarded that the entire colonial and protectorate periods were dark periods in the history of Africa and that the African political identity (and Cameroonian political identity in this case) must precede the arrival of Europeans.

Well… not quite, and I conducted a simple experiment to demonstrate this. I superimposed a map of modern Cameroon on ten different maps from different sources that show the territory of the ancient Bantu peoples. In every case, the Bantu territory leaves out what is presently North West and South West Regions.

Once again, the Bantu argument fails the identity test.

2.1.3. Community Federalism

More recently, MP and leader of PCRN political party proposed new lines for a possible federal arrangement based on cultural communities. The proposal puts together the Northern Regions, combines the Centre, South and East Regions into one community, puts the Grassfield regions (West and North West) together and the Sawa group (Littoral and South West Regions) together.

This effort does three things that prove a Francophone crisis. First, it tries to find common denominators on which a Cameroonian identity can be founded; second, it negates an Anglophone identity and finally, it demonstrates an infatuation that Francophones have with finding an identity while denying to Anglophones that which they claim and uphold.

2.2. Anglophones: A stubborn Minority

The second pointer to the existence of a Francophone crisis in Cameroon is the fact that the perdurance of the current instability reveals multiple failures by the Francophone Hegemony to subjugate the Anglophone community.

The violation in 1972 of Article 47 of the 1961 constitution, the suspension of the position of Vice President, the change of name from Federal Republic to United Republic and to La Republique, hyper-centralisation of government, systematic erosion of the education and judiciary cultures of the Anglophone community did not cause the expected wholesale assimilation.

As a result, Anglophones are perceived as a stubborn minority. THE refusal by the Francophone majority to recognise the root causes of the current problem is an expression of a Francophone community in crisis of admission of its failures.

2.3. Leadership crisis

The Francophone community is also struggling to accept it's failed leadership and, methinks, it's inability to admit to it's cowardice is manifested by heaping opprobrium on the Anglophone community. Some of the most significant political reforms in Cameroon can be credited to Anglophones.

2.3.1. When Anglophones asked for the return to multi party politics in the early 1990s, Francophones rejected the idea. However the demand was acceded to and Francophones are currently founders of over 85% of political parties authorised in Cameroon.

2.3.2. When Anglophones asked for a GCE Board for the Anglophone subsystem of education, the Francophone subsystem obtained its own board.

2.3.3. When Anglophones called for a return to federalism in 1993 and 1994, Francophone protested against what they called an outrageous request. However the whole country obtained decentralisation to the great joy of Francophones.

2.3.4. At the realisation that decentralisation was stuck on the conveyor belt, Anglophones pushed the demand further and everybody (including Francophones) obtained, finally, the implementation of decentralisation.

2.3.5. When Anglophones protested against Francophone teachers in Anglophone colleges and universities, all universities were reformed.

2.3.6. Francophones finally agreed that it was right for pupils to wear uniforms to school.

If the crisis in Cameroon should be attributed to any one of the historical communities, it should be a Francophone crisis, not an Anglophone crisis. The crisis is the result of systemic and systematic leadership failures by the majority and the projection of those failures upon the minority. 

2.4. Failed education system

The Francophone subsystem of education has also led in the deterioration of the quality of education in Cameroon.

2.4.1. It is the Francophone education system that introduced the idea that below average could be a pass in an examination.

2.4.2. It is the Francophone system that validated the idea that a candidate in a professional examination could be successful not because of their performance or competence but because of their origin.

2.4.3. Despite rejecting the qualitative predominance of the Anglophone subsystem of education, not only was the certification system in Francophone universities modified to rhyme with the Anglophone system but also, Anglophone schools have been flooded by Francophone learners.

Examples abound which show that contrary to the illusion of an Anglophone crisis, there is a real Francophone crisis in the country. Some have even alluded to the fact that it is the ghost of the UPC party that is haunting its torturers. Others have argued that the political, social, economic and cultural meltdown of Francophone Africa is not only indicative of a broader failure of the concept of Francophonie but also that the crisis in Cameroon is a manifestation of that meltdown. The failures Francophone education, political leadership, identity and national stewardship are grave and their severity is made even more glaring when compared to the Anglophone system and heritage.

When Jean Paul Sartre says "l'enfer c'est les autres" or "Hell is other people", he is making reference to the constant existential struggle of seeing oneself in the consciousness of another. Political posturing, psychological projection and the metaphysical mirroring of oneself in the consciousness of the other are what explain the fact that a deep Francophone crisis is called an Anglophone crisis.

CONCLUSION

The idea of a fake Anglophone crisis is unfounded if it means that the core grievances made by Anglophones do not have merit. Also, and probably unbeknownst to the author of "La fausse Crise anglophone" referred to earlier, it is correct to describe the "Anglophone crisis" as 'fake' since the appellation better reflects the collective insecurities of the Francophone community.

SUMMARY

1. THERE IS AN ANGLOPHONE PROBLEM IN CAMEROON

- Violation of Article 47 of the 1961 constitution

- Systematic efforts to erode Anglophone identity

- Rampant marginalization

- Systematic erosion of judiciary culture

- Unequal access to opportunities and resources

2. THERE'S NO ANGLOPHONE CRISIS IN CAMEROON

- Anglophones know their history, are agreed on it and defend it

- There are historical, cultural and political denominators that unite the Anglophone community as a homogenous whole.

- Anglophones know their status of equal partner (in the spirit of the Foumban 1961 accords) within the union and ask for no more than that... Except when that minimum is denied

- Anglophone grievances may have matured through various flashpoints in the history of the union but have never mutated

3. THERE IS A FRANCOPHONE CRISIS IN CAMEROON

- The Francophone community does not have a homogenous political, cultural and even managerial identity that all refer to

- The destruction of the UPC party in the late 1950s and 1960, the need to create a strong man to replace the cult of the UPC in 1960 and then create a cult around another personality in the early 1980s meant that history was revised many times and in many ways. This led to a complete loss of historical referents necessary to build a viable community.

- Despite efforts to subjugate Anglophones, Francophones can't handle the fact that Anglophones still determine the political agenda or that the tail keeps wagging the dog

- In summary, the Francophone majority has mismanaged what could have been a good union and are unhappy that the minority Anglophones are making it known... THAT IS THE FRANCOPHONE CRISIS

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Harry ACHA

November 2021