THE URGENCY AND COMPLEXITY OF DIALOGUE IN THE ANGLOPHONE PROBLEM

ACCOUNT I
 I'm so confused. I'm so scared. I'm so angry. My neighbour was shot yesterday. He was a young man. Very popular in the neighborhood. It's not clear what he had done. The period for the curfew as officially declared had expired. And even if it hadn't, I don't know why he deserved to be shot. There had been a distress call a few blocks away. A few youths came out to assist. About seven or eight of them. I was peeping through the window and watched the scene. The soldiers routed them, tear-gassed them, then opened fire. As the young men ran away, a bullet caught one of them… on his buttock. The soldiers came after them. News had spread of people shot and their bodies taken away. So, before the soldiers reached them, the boys carried their wounded friend and vanished through the thin alleyways of the neighbourhood. They managed to take him to hospital but he had probably lost so much blood… I just heard that he died the next day.

 

ACCOUNT II
 In the heat of the curfew, a Mbororo man in the hills found himself with no other alternative than to take his wife on a motorbike and rush her to hospital. His wife was pregnant and in labour and rural hospitals and health centres do not have operational ambulances as we’re well aware. The decision that instituted a provisional curfew was not accompanied by measures to be taken in case of health emergencies. As the man rode out with his ailing wife, they were spotted by a helicopter patrolling above. In the spirit of the Radio Communiqué signed by the prefect for Manyu Division on 27th September 2017, they were considered persona non grata, separatists aides, and shot without question as terrorists. Both of them… shot dead without questions, just for being outside at the wrong time.

 

ACCOUNT III
There's a general disquiet here at Travelers (a neighborhood in Bamenda). Motorbike riders have woken up this morning (Thursday 5th October 2017) and found their motorbikes burnt to ashes. About nine or ten of them. They were all parked for the night at a makeshift parking spot and a guard had been recruited to watch over them. Not only can no-one tell the whereabouts of the guard but also none can tell who damaged the bikes nor why.
Newer bikes were taken away, those that were chain-locked were broken and loose ones were dragged out and burnt.

 

Such accounts are as many as they are varied but all equally shocking. The following have also been reported:

•  At least one person said to have been killed by teargas suffocation.
•  Racketeering - people arrested and asked to pay heavily for their release
•  Houses broken into and all persons found shot in the legs
•  Neighborhoods with many Anglophones in Yaoundé policed, houses searched without warrants and many detained
•  In the Northwest and Southwest Regions, youths have escaped into the forests and up the hills
•  Arrests and detention even of pregnant women
•  Deaths and mass migration as people attempt to leave areas where they feel targeted and suspected just because they're indigenous persons of that Anglophone area.
•  Police/Gendarmerie posts attacked
•  Bodies are said to have been found at various locations in Buea and it's environs

And more…

- The local media are reporting.
- Government has made it's version of the events known.
- Reports are flooding on social media.
- Foreign media are talking about the events.
And the versions are all different.

 

The Head of State has called for dialogue on his official Facebook page on 1st October 2017. The US Government has done same. The UK, EU and UN have followed suit. Closer to scenes of action, clergymen have called for dialogue along with leaders of political parties, civil society leaders and other public figures. Yet the crisis persists and casualties continue to rise.

- The government has acknowledged about 10 fatalities.
- The SDF Party (3rd October) said about 32 persons had been killed.
- On 1st October alone, some social media accounts recorded 71 fatalities.
- The Human Rights Protection Network - REDHAC (Réseau des Défenseurs des Droits Humains) reports over 100 killed.

 

The tensions are palpable and the provocations are multiple. And a time will have to come when it all comes to an end. What no-one knows is whether it will get worse before it gets better. In an article titled “So this is how it starts", Monique Kwachou describes the slow but sustained degeneration of social strife and how simple social/political grievances became what we now know of Rwanda and Somalia.

 

Much water has passed under the bridge.

Although the root causes of the problem are known, there seems to be a general acceptance that in over half a century of living together, good governance and a little good faith would have shelved them quite comfortably. Perhaps that's why Barrister Akere Muna condemns the consequences of “gouvernance par la ruse" or... to attempt a loose translation, a kind of governance characterised by crafted cynicism. There is no quick fix in the current circumstances and atmosphere.

 

If the ‘root causes’ had been managed properly the sectoral grievances raised in 2015 would not have emerged.

 

If the sectoral grievances had been addressed, teachers and lawyers may not have referred to root causes otherwise referred to as the Anglophone Problem.

 

If the establishment had not mockingly dismissed the existence of the Anglophone Problem, the grievances of teachers and lawyers may not have attracted the attention and sympathy of the entire Anglophone community in support of a return to federalism.

 

If the establishment had not closed the door to the possibility of federalism in favour of a half-hearted offer for decentralization which itself has not been fully implemented in almost a quarter of a century, the secessionists would not have had half a chance of appealing to the aggrieved population.

 

In late 2016, Barrister Felix Nkongho Agbor Balla (President of the Fako Lawyers Association and President of the banned Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium) said (on “Cartes sur Table” on STV television channel) that if the federalism that people were asking for at the time was not given consideration, there will be a time when that same federalism would not seem good enough for them. Literature abounds on sustained escalation of the crisis and progressive degradation of the social fabric. But one thing is clear… These are desperate times. They are times when we must recognise the deep fractures existing and/or engineered within our society and... in the interest of the whole, beyond the twinkle that our lifespans represent, we must look beyond caressing our little egos... we must act beyond media games and partisan politics and start talking to each other rather than at each other.

 

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WHAT NEXT
Many have talked about dialogue and a few of them have been referred to above. However, for any dialogue to be possible and fruitful, some URGENT ACTIONS are needed both for the purpose of de-escalation by both sides, and for the purpose of creating an appropriate atmosphere for dialogue. This may actually be a psychological process that allows the Anglophone side to recognise that the government has territorial competence and de facto authority across the entire country; and the Government to recognise that Anglophones are a people with a unique culture and history and will fight to protect their identity within the union or will consider all other options.

 

URGENT ACTION
 

1. COMPLAINTS OFFICE
 This country desperately needs an INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS OFFICE. Considering the accounts reported above, and the enormous differences in fatalities reported and/or admitted to, it is important and urgent to create such a service where people can register their complaints and experiences. The following could be taken into account:
 - The office will be independent.
 - It will comprise representatives of the UN, AU, human rights organisations, the clergy, the judiciary, the media, other civil society organisations and government IN EQUAL PROPORTIONS
 - Members shall have restricted immunity from prosecution for all work done within the framework of their mission
 - The Office will have clerks at the front desks to register complaints
 - It will have a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) organ to assist victims
 - It will have the power to investigate and prosecute
 - Upon reporting an incident, a victim or witness will be given the name of an appointed case officer and a timetable for investigation

 

2. INSTANT PUNISHMENT
A few weeks ago, an incident said to have started off as a crackdown on drug trafficking ended in gun firing and in at least one fatality. Known for its no-nonsense reactions to police brutality the population of Kumbo was more measured in its reaction and showed much restraint. Why? On the same day of the event the commander was fired and the sanction made public in national news. This immediate sanction gave the comforting impression that government cared about human life… including a Kumbo life, and that it would not condone abuse by forces of law and order.

Many years ago, it was clearly made known when a high government official had been dismissed for poor performance, mismanagement or otherwise. Since appointments are only read in French, the well known expression was «relevé de ses fonctions», meaning… fired. These days, for similar underperformance or mismanagement by an official, another person is simply appointed to their position with no further comment. As a result, a direct relation of causality between crime and punishment no longer exists.

 

Had the Minister who referred to Anglophones as “two cubes of sugar” been instantly fired and declared unfit to hold public office on account of his statement, the governor who referred to protesters as dogs would have known that he had only a few hours left.

 

However, when the same member of government was appointed to negotiate a crisis for which his statement and thought were exemplifications of the problem, it is not surprising that a journalist would refer to Anglophones as rats and get away with it. What is surprising is that when Anglophones accept their “rat status" and offer to jump over the cliff rather than be pushed, they are further stigmatized.

 

A video went viral on 1st October showing a brutal crackdown on defenceless people. People could be seen dragged across the street on their backsides into a truck and beaten. It is possible to identify the location, the unit operating in the area, the commander and the persons responsible for the brutality. However, because similar cruelty took place in Buea in late 2016 and there are only rumours that the policemen were punished, the excesses of 1st October should not come as a surprise.

Should government start purging all persons whose statements and actions do disservice to the Anglophones feeling of belonging, the problem will be half solved.

 

3. DEMILITARISATION
 The Northwest and Southwest regions need to be demilitarized immediately… URGENTLY. I hasten to state that I recognise that increased violence and arson require increased surveillance but also that surveillance enacted by heavy militarisation and brutalisation is not only counterproductive but also indicates a failure in community policing and the limited trust (if any) that the population has for the police.

 

4. VISIT BY HEAD OF STATE
 Finally, it would help if the Head of State turned up in Buea, Bamenda, Kumbo and Mamfe in jeans and rolled up sleeves or an African boubou and just say to the people… “I've heard you". I'm sure he knows what Heads of State do in times of crisis better than I do. What I know, and that he may not fully know, is that Anglophones are really not asking for much… just that the little they ask is the minimum they'll settle for. Need I say more?

 

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DIALOGUE
Many have called for dialogue as mentioned earlier and many more will continue to do so. However, inasmuch as there are calls for dialogue, not much is being said about the format for it. I make no claim to being a crisis resolution expert but as a keen observer of society and politics, I'll raise a few concerns around the question under the titles: WHERE, WHO, WHAT/WHY, WHEN and HOW? These concerns do not translate into a roadmap, but I hope that they would cause both sides to consider their excesses objectively, recognise the nuisance ability of one another and give priority to humans by opting for dialogue.

 

WHERE?
The concern here is much less about the physical location for dialogue than it is the psychosocial context of it. So the title ‘WHERE’ aims to look at the preparation of an environment that is conducive for dialogue.

 

In the circumstances, no Anglophone who can validly make a claim to legitimacy and representativeness would accept to sit around a table for dialogue with the current levels of militarization of the Northwest and Southwest regions.

 

It is unlikely that any would sit around the table knowing that the internet shut down is still in force or while hundreds are still in detention or in exile. So both sides will have minimum requirements.

 

Before government agrees to dialogue, it will ask for the following as minimum:
 - Full resumption of schools and courts
 - All Anglophones who take part must openly declare that they are not separatist nor would they play the separatist card during the dialogue
 - A suspension of SCBC during the entire period of the dialogue.

Before Anglophones agrees to dialogue, they will ask for the following as minimum:
 - Complete demilitarization of the Northwest and Southwest Regions
 - The assurance that two state federalism according to the 1961 configuration is an option that can be discussed
 - Liberation of all persons detained for matters related to the struggle and immunity all delegates that may be coming from abroad for the dialogue.

 

WHO
Who can sit around the table is another difficult matter.

 

Many leaders of political parties have made proposals and calls for dialogue and because none has set a clear roadmap, format and timetable, it has seemed to me that their calls have the ultimate objective of lobbying for seats around the table.

 

However, if the SDF, CPP and PAP whose offer for a ten state federation come closest to the 1961-style two state federation that I would expect Anglophones to be aiming at, then their very postures may engineer their disqualification as legitimate representatives of Anglophones.

 

However, if government decides to position the dialogue as a National Forum for Exchange (knowing that the term ‘National Conference’ will not be used) at which various political parties will be invited, such a composition will automatically recreate an Anglophone minority around the table and defeat the purpose from the unset.

 

If government decides to use the parliamentary channel, once again, this would not seem appropriate as there is a general feeling within the Anglophone community that with the exception of Joseph Wirba, all their parliamentary representatives have delegitimized themselves. This too may be a dead end.

 

So, it will be hard to identify delegates that are acceptable to both sides. What seems easier to predict is that both sides would not agree to dialogue with delegates whose postures and statements have been perceived as overly incendiary or with persons whose presence may give them legitimacy. As such, actors on the Anglophone side who have either promoted violence or supported it as well as persons who incarnate the spirit of separation may not be acceptable to government. Also, the person who alluded to two cubes of sugar or that who suggested that lawyers will return to court when they get hungry may not be seen as fair interlocutors.

 

Finally, considering the root causes and the legal basis on which the increased autonomy of the former Southern Cameroons rests, it would seem legitimate that the UN and AU should have seat.

 

WHAT/WHY
WHAT will be the agenda of the dialogue… What will delegates talk about?
WHY is there a problem… Pace of decentralization? Or Non-respect of the spirit of the 1961 constitution, otherwise known as root cause?

 

These will be very hard questions to answer. It seems that though the facts of history weigh in the favour of Anglophones’ to push for federalism, the government's side still holds the critical mass of the population that would settle for an acceleration of the process of decentralisation. The only way out for Anglophones to sway popular support would be to find ways of protecting the Anglophone identity (education, common law etc) and at the same time agree to a ten-state federation and leave the struggle for another generation.

 

WHEN?
DIALOGUE is URGENT but can be slow and painstaking. The difficulties raised above will not be resolved in a day or in a month. For months, facilitators or mediators will have to work covertly with both sides and apart in order to de-escalate the crisis, set an agenda, identify delegates, soften minimum requirements and set a timetable.

In the meantime, both sides will upscale blackmail. There are many signs of this already. While the government is working hard to give the Anglophone movement a terrorist tag, the Anglophone side is working hard to tag the government with wanton brutality, excessive use of force, human rights violation and an unavowed penchant for “anglo-cleansing".

 

So, WHEN will dialogue start? DIALOGUE WILL START WHEN BOTH SIDES DECIDE THAT IT IS TIME TO CUT THEIR LOSSES.

 

My opinion is that both sides are already incurring severe losses but the urge for each to achieve their agenda without making concessions is blinding them from any objective analysis of reality and pushing them into senseless acts of desperation.

 

GOVERNMENT LOSSES
1. Government's credibility as a fair regulator of the sociological components of the country has been serious hit. Anglophone systematic marginalisation has become established and generally accepted. And though the Anglophone community cannot be compared to other tribal components of the Cameroon society, the characteristically tribal mode of governance has been laid bare.

 

2. In the Anglophone regions especially, the crisis has exposed the deep fracture between the populations and their administrative officers and projected the idea that government’s authority is coerced and not willfully accepted.

 

3. The arbitrary arrests, torture and killings have severely damaged the country’s human right record.

 

4. By dialoguing with delegates, then arresting them, government did not gain much credit as a reliable interlocutor for social dialogue.

 

PROTESTERS’ LOSSES
1. The Anglophone cause is starting to lose Francophone sympathy on the one hand because the initial strategy (if there was one) did not contain a structured communication package aimed at Francophones who may be insensitive to the Anglophone plight; and on the other hand because of the unjustified use of violence, arson and prolonged closure of schools. Another reason is that the government may be having some success with tagging the protest movement as a terrorist movement.

 

2. Considering that arson, school boycott and ghost towns have been the only modes of protest, their prolonged use with little substantive gains is starting to raise doubts within the anglophone community over the understanding by their leaders of the management of prolonged protests and their ability to change strategy, maintain pressure without delving into violence.

 

3. Thousands of Anglophone students have lost one academic year and month into the start of another, school resumption is not yet effective. The risk of losing another year will not be palatable for too long.

 

4. The number of people killed has traumatized Anglophones as individuals and as a community to a point where they may not cope with more pain if the killing spree continues.

Elections in 2018 may also determine the timing of dialogue. If no breakthrough is found before the scheduled elections, Anglophones would be likely to vote in representatives that they can have greater control over or who can better reflect their aspirations.

 

COMMENTS ON DIALOGUE.
 Political Dialogue is complex and can take place in various ways:
 

(i) High-level or summit dialogues involving the top leadership of contending sections of the population. These dialogues are often initiated or mediated by the international community. These are high-risk events, with much at stake.
 

(ii) Track Two interventions by civil society organizations that provide discrete and relatively low-risk opportunities to explore options, and build trust and skill in the process of dialogue.
 

(iii) Multi-level dialogue, where dialogue takes place at various levels of society in an effort to engage citizens in building sufficient national
 consensus on critical challenges.

 

These three approaches are not mutually exclusive, rather complementary. Each type has its advantages and limitations. It is often advisable to pursue different types of dialogue in parallel, on the condition that they pursue the same overall objectives and are not contradictory.

 

Another significant level of complexity is the ability for each side to find common ground within their own separate ranks. Government will have to recognise and reconcile the moderate voices within its ranks with the hawkish positions; and the Anglophone side will need to close the widening gap between federalists and separatists. These challenges for both sides are interesting yet dissimilar. On the government side (government here refers to administration and ruling party) moderates who would consider greater autonomy beyond decentralisation dare not speak publicly. On the Anglophone side, federalists are stigmatized and bullied. For any dialogue to receive popular support therefore, the identification of common ground, achievable targets, what would constitute a ‘win’ and the development of strategy will be crucial but no less complex.

 

THE EXPERIENCE OF DIALOGUE IN CAMEROON
We can speculate all we want and hope as we may for dialogue, but never lose sight, firstly, of the fact that dialogue is evidence of deadlock. That is why it only kicks in when both sides find the need to cut their losses.

In the current situation, the government will only accede to dialogue
A. If another school year is threatened
B. If its image/brand starts being affected in such a way that it affects its ability to lobby internationally
C. If it starts losing its critical mass of francophone support
D. If there is a sense that the persistence of the crisis may negatively affect elections in 2018.

 

On their part, Anglophones will accede to dialogue if
A. They lose international sympathy through the campaign to tag them as terrorists
B. If they start losing the popular support they presently enjoy.

 

These circumstances need to come together at about the same time, else, if they arise for one side and not for the other, the side that is in a position of strength will try to obtain its desires without making concessions.

 

Next, political dialogue rests on good faith and on this count, the government of Cameroon has a track record on internal political dialogue that most would find daunting.

1. In 1961, East Cameroon desired a unitary State and Southern Cameroons desired a confederation. Both sides agreed to a federal system that was abolished 11 years later in favour of East Cameroon’s initial desire.

 

2. In 1972, the idea of “United Republic" seemed like a concession and recognition of the Anglophone identity within the Union. It was abolished 12 years later in favour of the original name of the independent state of East Cameroon before October 1961.

 

3. The dialogue that was triggered by the events of 1990 led to the introduction of decentralisation and a limitation in the number of presidential mandates the 1996 constitution. Decentralisation has not been effective 21 years later and the limitation in the presidential mandate was abolished 12 years after it became law and 3 years before anyone could benefit or be victim.

4. In 2016, the government took part in dialogue, registered complaints, arrested delegates in the dialogue, then proposed solutions. Consequently, although government can brandish some measures taken since late 2016, those measures have a hint of unilateralism.

 

The track record of political dialogue in Cameroon therefore is such that many guarantees are required to protect both delegates and decisions agreed to.

 

DIALOGUE AND THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONS
The “State” is an abstract concept which, beyond population, territory, laws and economy, refers to the network of institutions that guarantee harmony among the whole. But if there is the population (human factor), then that population's preferences, its aspirations, its expectations, its values are constantly changing; and thus, the institutions that constitute a state must have the necessary flexibility that allows them to either to constantly adjust to new circumstances or to ensure the permanence of dialogue.

 

If a state is unitary, centralised, decentralised, federal or confederal, its form is stated in a constitution. But operationally, that form is actually a manner in which people interact with the institutions that regulate them. The form of each state therefore reflects a form of dialogue. A specific call for dialogue therefore as a response to a crisis is by definition an indication of the fact that the existing form of the state does not guarantee the permanence of dialogue nor does it reflect the aspiration of citizens.

 

In an effort to counter the federalist aspiration, Professor Mathias Eric Owona Nguini has argued variously that a state cannot have concurrent visions of its form. He is right. But he is also right in avoiding the argument that the firm of a state is an emanation of a dynamic base and not a static target that all things should converge at. If Cameroon defines itself as a Unitary State but does not guarantee the sense of belonging of a certain part of its population, the ‘oneness’ declared remains an ideological fancy rather than a reality or even imminent hope.. This highlights the urgency for such institutional reform that would adequately reflect the history, identities and aspirations of the peoples of Cameroon.

 

On 21st September 2017, administrative officers signed decisions banning all protests in the Northwest and Southwest Regions. On 22nd October 2017, when the ban was supposed to be effective, arguably the largest demonstration ever witnessed in Cameroon was staged across the two regions. This can be interpreted in two ways. EITHER, the demonstrators criminally disrespected established order, OR the signed orders and the laws that inspired them did not reflect the strength of feeling that inhabited the people nor did it take into account the fact that the protesters were burning with the need show that they come from a tradition where they make it known when they have grievances.

 

Minority grievances are of a special kind and their specificities and complexities are a function of the political history attached.

 

By accepting to achieve independence by associating with La République du Cameroun in 1961, Anglophones had an implicit understanding of the dynamics of demography and democracy. However, the form of the state, institutional guarantees and the protection of those guarantees (article 47, 1961 constitution) ensured political dialogue. Fifty six years later, Anglophones have not lost the memory that part of the territory that belongs to the entire union once belonged to them.

Any effort to overcome the current crisis through dialogue must therefore take into account both the grievances expressed and the institutional shortcomings that provoke (ensure) the recurrence of the problem.

 

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CONCLUSION
In the foregoing, we have shown that Cameroon is at a crossroads. We have shown that the crisis that has gripped the nation since late 2016 has degenerated into such violence and multiple loss of human lives that de-escalation and dialogue have become urgent.

 

About four people had died in events related to the crisis in December 2016 when protesters were hinting at or toying with the idea of federalism. At the time it was almost taboo to say the word federalism though protesters made a direct and obvious relationship between their grievances and the form of the state.

 

In an article titled “The Anglophone Problem” published by Bakwa Magazine (as well as in this Blog), I suggested that the summary rejection of the root causes of the problem was causing secession to become more palatable to some and that though it was unlikely to become reality, federalism seemed inevitable.

 

Nine months later dozens have died (considering the most conservative estimates), many have been maimed, many have lost property, thousands of students have lost a full academic year and both sides have escalated both violence and divisive rhetoric and actions. For the first time, the international media has condemned excessive use of force by security forces and wanton violence by both sides.

 

Many have called for urgent dialogue although no such appeal has been accompanied by a clear format for proceedings. I may not have exactly proposed a roadmap or format either, but I have attempted, to raise some of the complexities involved, should dialogue be envisaged.

Dialogue alone, however, even if it is effective and prepares the way for better governance and representativeness, may not necessarily guarantee harmonious relationships between the feuding sides. A Truth and Reconciliation commission may facilitate healing for Anglophones who feel that the have been marginalised for half a century; for some Francophones who are increasingly coming to the realisation that by words or actions, they have been unconscious oppressors… a Truth and Reconciliation commission may allow the country to know who gave the order to “shoot to kill" that resulted in ACCOUNT II above… it may just be that one thing that causes Cameroon to truly become one and indivisible.

 

First made public on
10th October 2017